Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning theory: a theory that seeks to explain the meaning of meaning. Problem the concept of meaning and truth seem to presuppose each other._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.A. Foster on Meaning Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I 4 Meaning Theory/m.th./Foster: the meaning theory does not say what is "meaning" but it reveals what conditions it must meet. - Analog: Science theory does not explain what is the concept of a natural law, but it covers the canon of scientific methods. I 6 Meaning Theory/Foster: the extension of "means that p" is not determined by the truth value or the extensional structure of the sentence , which is used for "p". - It is an error to presuppose an intensional idiom for "that means" (presupposes what we are looking for). - Solution: Extension instead of intension. I 7 Meaning Theory/ Foster: examined language L: is about (contingent) facts - metalanguage: uses essentially methodological vocabulary (not contingent) to establish the theorems. I 11 Meaning Theory/truth theory/FosterVsDavidson: the truth condition is determined to set out the specific truth value in all circumstances. - Problem : Tarski: the scheme would correspond to a counterfactual condition "would be true if ... " - but the schema is indicative. I 17 Meaning Theory/Foster: Problem: all T-sentences of the Tarski schema ("Snow is white" is true iff snwo is white) remain true if one uses just something that preserves the truth values and the right side is a translation of the left. - It provides no meaning, only a truth-definition. A meaning Theory can arise when one knows that the conditions are met - i.e. that the truth th. is a meaning theory. I 19 But only if the theory is formulated in the same language as the object language - Because the theory is not really interpreting. Solution/Foster: We need the facts and the knowledge that the facts are truth-theoretical. I 20 Then the meaning theory is a single sentence: q *: " a truth theory T in L represents that ... " - I 21 ... if we are aware, we can find out what determines each selected sentence. - This implies the ability to interpret each sentence due to its structure , because it implies to perceive what each element contributes. ( >Compositionality) Per: that is interpretive. Vs: Problem: "notes that" is still intensional! I 22 E.g. someone who does not know what U denotes, could know the facts that U says . - Problem: if the meaning theory is purely extensional, then it is no longer interpreting. Summary: Meaning theory/Foster: is a meaning theory for an object language L0 in the design of an appropriate range of possible worlds if it exhausts all possible facts that allows our philosophical standpoint. This together with a finite set of axioms true, which provides for each L0 - sentence S the relevant canonical reformulation of the T-conditional. This would consist of the scheme "(w) (x is true-of-w, if w, then it would be the case that p)" by inserting the structural description (sound, character) of S for "p." Instead of "part-of" relation "material-part-of" is between x and y: if y is a world and x is an ordered pair whose first element is the class of all material things, and whose second element is the class of all ordered pairs of all the tangible things that are in the part-whole relation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Foster
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27